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evaluate the resources that each node has to contribute for participating in an overlay network. Such a cost mcdei allows to gauge potential disincentives for nodes to collaborate, and provides a measure of the "total cost" of a network, which is a possible benchmark to distinguish between different network architectures. We characterize the cost imposed on a node as a parametrized function of the experienced bad and of the node connectivity, and express benefits in terms of cost reductions. We discuss the notions of social optimum and Nash equilibrium with respect to the proposed cost model. We show that the social optimum may significantly deviate from a Nssh equilibrium when nodes value the resources they use to forward traffic on behalf of other nodes. Through analytical and numerical results, we then use the proposed cost model to evaluate some of the topologies recently proposed for overlay networks, and to exhibit some of the challenges systems designers may face. We conclude by outlining some of the open questions this research has raised.
I . TKTRODUCTION
Overlay networks play an increasing role in modern data communications. Examples of overlays include peer-to-peer file-sharing systems 111, ad-hoc networks 123, distributed lookup services [3], [4J, application-layer multicasi overlays 151-171, virtual private networks [8], or content delivery networks [9] , to name a few.
Despite the growing popularity of overlay networks, there is no general consensus regarding how different overlay network topologies compare with each other. System architects may choose B parficular overlay topology according to the graphtheoretic properties of the topology. For instance, de Bruijn graphs have recently received significant attention in the distributed lookup community [lO] -[lZ], due to their short average routing distance and high resiliency to node failures. Other architectures, notably application layer multicast overlays, e.g., 161 , 171, are usually designed so that the overlay topology exhibits desirable properties with respect to the underlying, physical, network.
This paper aims at providing a formal framework for evaluating and comparing overlay topologies. More precisely, the first contribution of this paper is a cost-based model to assess T l u s work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation through grants ANI-0085879 and ANI-0331659. A preliminary version of some of the material in this papzr was presented at the Third International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'OJ).
the resources that each overlay node has to contribute for being part of the overlay. We express the benefits of participating in the overlay in terms of a cost reduction. Such a cost model has several useful applications, among which.
(1) providing a benchmark that can be used to compare between different proposals, (2) allowing for predicting disincentives, and designing mechanisms that ensure a protocol is sfrategyproof [13] , and (3) facilitating the design of load balancing primitives.
Using the proposed cost model, our second contribution is to characterize the topologies that yield the lowest resource usage over the entire network (social optimum), as well as the topologies that are likely to be formed if each node is let free to select which links to maintain (Nash equi [ibriuni) . This study is particularly useful to assess whether allowing each participant in the overlay to adopt a rational (Le., selfish) behavior results in am outcome desirable for all participants. Our main result is that the social optimum can significantly deviate from a Nash equilibrium when nodes value the resources they use to forward traffic on behalf of other nodes.
Our third contribution lies in the cost-based analysis of several topologies recently proposed in the context of distributed lookup services [31, [4] , [lo] , [12] , j141. We provide analytical and numerical results to compare the costs incurred by each topology. We contrast these results with those obtained for the social optima, and discuss the implications of the observed costs on system design.
This work is not the first attempt to provide a model for the cost of participating in a network. Jackson and Wolinslq [15] proposed cost models to analyze formation strategies in social and economic networks. More recent studies [161, 1171 model network formation as a non-cooperative game, where nodes have an incentive to participate in the network, but want to minimize the price they pay for doing so. Our approach extends these previously proposed cost models, by considering the load imposed on each node in addition to the distance to other nodes and degree of connectivity. Furthermore, we not only use the proposed cost model to characterize social optima and Nash equilibria, but also as a benchmark to analyze existing overlay topologies. In that respect our work is complementary to recent graph-theoretic studies comparing topological properties of various overlays 1123, [18] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 11, we introduce our proposed cost model. In Section 111, we derive the social optima and Nash equilibria in the proposed cost model. In Section IV, we apply the cost model to several routing geometries used in recently proposed overlay architectures and compare analytically the costs incurred by each geometry. We illustrate and extend our analysis with numerical results obtained by simulation in Section V. Finally. we conclude the paper in Section VI, and discuss some open problems this research has uncovered.
PROPOSED COST MODEL
We start with a formal description of the cost model we propose. The cost model applies to any (overlay) network where nodes request and serve items, or serve requests between other nodes. Let us define a routing geometry as in [18] , that is, as a collection of edges, or topology, associated with a route selection mechanism. Unless otherwise noted, we assume shorlest path routing in the overlay topology, and distinguish between different topologies; thus, we will interchangeably use the terms "topology" and "geometry" in the rest of this paper. Note that, a vast majority of overlay architectures. e.g., C31, [4] . [fil, [71, [101-[121~ U41, [191-1211, do use shortest path routing in the overlay topology, which is quite different from using shortest path routing in the underlying physical network [6] .
We define an overlay network by a quadruplet (V, E: K? F ) , where V , the set of nodes in the network, and E, the set of directed edges, characterize the topology used in the overlay.
In addition. K is the set of items in h e network, and F : K i I/ is the function that assigns items to nodes. Each node 71. E V is assigned a unique identifier (integer or string of symbols), which, for the sake of simplicity, we will also denote by U . We define by Ku = { k E K : F(k) = U } the sei of items stored at node U f V . We have K = U, K,,, and we assume, without loss of generality, that the sets Ku are disjoint. ' We characterize each request with two independent random variables, S E V and I" E K , which denote the node X issuing the request, and the item Y being requested, respectively.
Consider a given node U E V . Every time an item k E K i s requested in the entire network, node U is in one of four situations:
Case 1: Idle. Node U does not hold or request k, and is not on the routing path of the request. Node U is not subject to any cost.
Case 2: Issuing the request. Node U requests item I;. In our model, we express the benefits of participating in an overlay network in terms of latency reduction, similar to related proposals, e.g., [17] . In particular, we assume that the farther the node 'L' holding k is from U. (in a topological sense), the costlier the request is. If there is no path between nodes U and v , the request cannot be carried out. which yields an infinite cost. More precisely, we model the cost incurred by node U 'If an item is stored on several nodes (replication), the replicas can be viewed as different items with the exact same probability of k i n g requested. 
We can in turn use C, to compute the tola1 cost of fhe
Last, the expression of C, only makes sense if S,, R,, Mu, and L, are all expressed using the same unit. Thus, the coefficients s,+ T,,c~, l,,k and mu,+ have to be selected appropriately. For instance, lu,k is given in monetary units per hop per item, while mu,v is expressed in monetary units. We next rely on our definition of the individual cost at a node U and of the total cost of the network to compute the social optima and Nash equilibria. 111 . SOCIAL OPTIMA AND NASH EQUILIBRIA In this section, we characterize the geometries that constitute a social optimum or a Nash equilibrium in the proposed cost model. The social optimum is defined as the routing geometry that minimizes the total cost C. A (pure) Nush equilibrium corresponds to a routing geometry where no node U can decrease its individual cost C, hy (deterministically) creating or removing a link. In other words, the social optimum is the outcome a system designer is likely to desire, while the Nash equilibrium describes the outcome that is likely to result from each node acting in its best interest. Thus. from a system designer's perspective, an ideal situation occurs when the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum correspond to the same topology. Conversely, when the social optimum is not a Nash equilibrium, one might need to devise mechanisms to realign the incentives of each individual node with a desirable global outcome, Studying Nash equilibria and social optima appears particularly useful in the context of self-forming networks, such as ad-hoc networks, or in describing peering relationships between Internet service providers, where individual nodes choose which links to maintain.
We next discuss a few simplifications useful to facilitate our analysis, before characterizing some possible social optima, and describing how they relate to the Nash equilibria.
A. Assumptions
For the remainder of this paper, we consider a network of N > 0 nodes, where, for all U E V and I; f K , l u , k I, su,b = s, r U , k = T , and for all U E V and 71 E V , mu,v = m. In other words, we assume that the costs associated with incurring a one-hop latency, serving one request, routing one request, or maintaining one link, are the same on all nodes, irrespective of the item requested or served.2 We suppose that the network i s in a steady-state regime, i.e., nodes do not join or leave the network, so that the values 1, s, T and m are constants. We aIso suppose that requests are uniformly distributed over the set of nodes, that is, for any node 'U? Pr1.X = U ] = l/N. For the time being, we make a further simplification by choosing the mapping function F such that all nodes have an equal probability of serving a request. In Last, we assume that no node is acting maliciously.
?%le very crude in general. this simplification is relatively accurate in the case of a network of homogeneous nodes and homogeneous links containing fixed-sized keys such as used in distributed hash tables.
Fir11 Mesh
In our investigauon of possible social optima, let us first consider a full mesh. that is, a network where any pair of nodes is connected by a bidirectional edge, i.e., -La+ = 1 for any PI # U . Nodes never any route any traffic and
and. summing over U .
Let us remove a link from the full mesh. for instance the link 0 -1. The maintenance cost at node 0, ,440. decreases by m.
However. to access the items held at node 1, node 0 now has to send a request through another node (e.g..' node 2): as a result, LO increases by I / N , and the routing cost at node 2, Ra, increases by r / N 2 . So, removing the link 0 -1 causes a change in the total cost AC = -n ? + / / N + r / N a . If A C 2 0, removing a link causes an increase of the total cost, and the full mesh is the social optimum. In particular. the full mesh is the social optimum if the maintenance cost is "small enough." that is. if
Note that, as AT . + 03, the condition in Eqn. (4) We can draw a parallel with the DNS example of Section I1 to illustrate condition (4). As long as Lhe number of Internet hosts remained reasonably small, each host used a large HOSTS. TXT file to directly resolve hostnames into IP addresses, effectively creating a full mesh for the naming overlay: each node knew about all the other nodes: DNS was only introduced when the number of hosts on the Internet grew large enough to render maintaining all information in a single, distributed file impractical.
C. Star Nemork
Suppose now that Eqn. (4) does not hold, and consider a star network. Let U = 0 denote the center of the star, which routes all traffic between peripheral nodes. That is. xu,,(0) = 1 for
that the cost CO incurred by the center of the star is Peripheral nodes do not route any traffic, i.e., R, = 0 for all U > 0. and are located at a distance of one from the center of the star, and at a distance of two from the ( N -3) other 3?ha actual mechanism that informs node 0 of which nod6 to contact to send a request to node I is irrelevant to this discussion. One can for instance assume without loss of generality that nodes periodically advertise their list of neighbors.
jNote that we are here only concerned with name resolution. Updating and disseminating the HOSTS .TXT file is a separate issue, and was actually done in a centralized manner 1221. w Since the difference CO -C, quantifies the (dis)incendve to be a priori in the center of the star. Proposition 1 tells us that there is a (dis)incentive to be i n the center of the star in a vast majority of cases.
Next, we compute h e total cost of the star. and determine under which condition it is a social optimum. Summing a s . ( 5 ) and (6 
From Eqs. ( 3 ) and (7), it follows that the right term in the above inequality is in fact equal to C(star). In other words,
we have shown the total cost of a star network is smaller than or equal to the cost of the social optimum, from which we I to nodes it is not connected to. Using the same reasoning for all nodes, we conclude that the fully connected network is the unique Nash equilibrium if .m < 1/N.
E. Int e rp n tarion
We summarize our findings in Fig. 1 , where we discriminate between social optima and Nash equilibria according to the value of m. For m < l / N . represented as a dark gray area in the figure, the full mesh is bath a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum; for m > 1/N + r/hr2 (white area), the star network is both a Nash equilibrium and a socid optimum. In both cases, the incentives of each node are aligned with the most efficient overall usage of the resources in the network.
The most interesting region in Fig. 1 As a corollary, a network where "forwarding comes for free" (i.e., T = 0), e.g., where bandwidth and computational power are extremely cheap, is ideal from the system designer's perspective, because individual incentives should produce a socially optimal solution. Unfortunately, in most networks. the price paid for forwarding data cannot be neglected, which suggests that our cost model is better suited at capturing possible disincentives than previous models solely based on node degree (i.e., maintenance costs) and hop count (i.e., latency costs).
Iv. ANALYSIS OF SOME PROPOSED OVERLAY ROUTING GEOMETRIES
In the discussion in the previous section, we have ignored robustness against attacks, fault-tolerance, or potential performance hottlenecks. All these Factors pose practical challenges in a centralized approach, as does providing an incentive to occupy (or relinquish) the central position of a star. Using a full mesh avoids most of these concerns, but, as we have seen, is only a solution for a modest number of nodes.
Many research efforts have been directed at designing overlay geometries that provide reasonable performance, whik addressing the aforementioned robustness concerns. In this section, we use our cost model to evaluate a few of the routing geometries that have been recently proposed for overlay networks in the networking literature. We focus on de Bruijn graphs, D-dimensional tori, PRR trees, and Chord rings. We derive analytically the various costs experienced by a node in each geometry. We will later compare our results with those obtained in our study of the social optima and Nash equilibria.
A. De Bnrijn Graphs
De Bruijn 
for nodes in V'. Now. consider that each node U has at most A neighbors. Then, node U has at most A' nodes at distance 2. at most A3 nodes at distance 3, and so forth. Note that, the expressions for both Lmin and L,, can be further simpIified for N = AD, that is, when the identifier space is fully populated. that the spatial disu-ibution of the nodes is uniform, and that the identifier space is fully populated, which enables us to pick y i +~ = ui+l,. . .,yo = U D . Thus, two nodes U and ' U at a distance of n hops differ in n digits. There are (f) ways of choosing which digits are different, and each such digit can take any of ( A -1) values. Sot for a given node U , there are (:)(A -lIn nodes that are at distance n from U . Multiplying by the total number of nodes N = AD, and dividing by the total number of paths N 2 , we infer that, for all U , U , and w, we have
B. D-dimensional Ton
Now, for any U and 11 such that = n, because routes are unique, there are exactly ( n -1 ) different nodes on the path between U and 'U. So, the probability that a node w picked at random is on the path from U to ' U is The total probability theorem tells us that 
D. Chord Rings
In a Chord ring [4] , nodes are represented using a binary suing (i.e.. A = 2). When the ring is fully populated, each node U is connected to a set of D neighbors, with identifiers
An analysis similar to that carried out for PRR trees yields El, and L, as in Eqs. (13) and (14) for A = 2. Simulations confirm this result [4].
E. Discrrssion
The analytical results we have derived in this section can serve a number of purposes. First. they confirm that all of the routing peomeuies considered here have the same asymptotic behavior: the routing costs decrease in log N , while the latency costs grow with log N . Second, while these asymptotic results are well known (see for instance C31, [41, [12], [IS] ), the main advantage of the above analysis is to provide closed-form equations that can be used for tuning configuration parameters such as 4 or D in function of the relative importance of each cost, e.g., routing cost vs. latency cost. Such a study of the configuration parameters is, however, outside the scope of the present paper. Third, our analysis provides us with a baseline we can use in a comparison with (1) the social optima and/or Nash equilibria and (2) more realistic scenarii where IN A DE BRUIJN GRAPH (1 = I, r = 1,000) the identifier space is sparsely populated or where some items are more popular than others. which is the object of the next section.
v. NUMERiCAL 
RESULTS
We present here some simulation results to validate and illustraie the analysis presented in Section IV. We complement the analysis by investigating numerically the effect of relaxing the assumptions that all items have identical popularity, and that the identifier space is fully populated.
A. Illustration of the Analysis
Let us first illustrate numerically the analysis of Section IV. In Table l7 we consider five de Bruijn graphs with different values for A and Dt and X and Y i.i.d. uniform random variables. Table I shows that while the latency costs of all nodes are comparable, the ratio between R,, and the second best case routing cost,6
is in general significant. Thus, if r >> 1, there can be an incentive for the nodes with R, = R, , , to defect. For instance, these nodes may leave the network and immediately come back, hoping to be assigned a different identifier U' f a. with a lower cost. Additional mechanisms, such as enforcing a cost of entry to the network, may be required to prevent such defections. We next simulate the costs incurred in the different geometries we discussed. We choose A = 2, for which the results for PRR trees and Chord rings are identical. We choose D = { 2: S} for the D-dimensional tori, and D = loga N for the other geometries. We point out that selecting a value for D and A common to all geometries may inadvertently bias one geometry against anoher. We emphasize that we only illustrate a specific example here, without making any general comparison between different geometries.
We vary the number of nodes between N = 10 and N = I, 000, and, for each value of N run ten differently seeded simulations, consisting of 100,000 requests each, with X and Y i.i.d. uniform random variables. We plot the latency and routing costs averaged over all nodes and all requests in Fig. 2 . The graphs show that our anatysis is validated by simulation, and that the star provides a lower average cost than all the other geometries. This result is consistent with our earlier finding that the star is, in many cases, a social optimum, which may be more desirable to the community as a whole than a distributed solution. Note however, that our cost Number of nodes (b) Routing cost (r = 1.000) Fig. 2 . the routing cost is constantly equal to 0, IS omitted for readability purposes.
Latency and routing costs. Curves marked "sim" present simulation results. The full mesh, for which the latency cost IS constantly equal to 1. and model does not take into account factors such as scalability and resiliency. both of which are cause for serious concerns in a completely centralized architecture. Additionally, while we have shown that $e star network was potentially a Nash equilibrium, we nevertheless need incentive mechanisms (e.g.. monetary rewards) to compensate for the asymmetry of a star network, and to convince a node to occupy the central position in the first place.
Asvmnetn in Item Popidarip
We investigate next how relaxing the assumption that all items have identical popularity impacts the results we have obtained so fa. To that effect, we run a set of experiments, where items have a popularity that follows a Zipf-like distribution defined as follows. Assume h e existence of a (bijective) function Rank : V 4 (1, . . . , AT}, that orders the nodes U E V by decreasing probability that a given item k is held by U. For instance, if Rank(u) = 1, the probability that node u holds an arbitrary item k is strictly higher than the probability that any node U # U holds k. Given Rank(u), we characterize the probability that U has to serve a given request as:
In the case a = 1, Eqn. (15) characterizes a Zipf distribution. Our motivation for using the distribution in Eqn. Initially, we select n = 8, so that each possible set of coordinates corresponds to a given node (because n D = N ) , and we then gradually increase n up to n = 32. In other words, for aH three topologies, we increase the identifier space from 512 to 32.768 identifiers. Identifiers that initially do not map to any node are selected using a uniform random variable. For each value of D (resp. n ) we run 100 experiments with different random seeds? corresponding to 100 different ways of populating the identifier space. Each experiment consists of 100,000 requests, where E: and Y are i.i.d. uniform random variables.
In Fig. 3 , for each geometry, we plot the average value of the ratios Rmax/Rkin, L m S / L m i n , and Mmax/A4Ain averaged over the 100 experiments corresponding to a given number of identifiers, as well as their worst-case (i.e., maximum) value over the same 200 experiments. For all geometries, we observe that the imbalance in latency costs remains relatively modest in a sparsely populated identifier space. The imbalance in maintenance costs is more significant, but the main observation is that the imbalance in routing costs can become very large.
This observation emphasizes the urgent need for efficient load balancing algorithms.
Last, in Fig. 4 , we plot the correlation coefficients between R and L, R and M , and L and M , as a function of the number of identifiers. Our main finding is that a sparsely populated identifier space has the effect of malung the different costs correlated. This confirms the intuition that the routing and latency costs of a given node are largely dependent on how we11 the node Is connected to the rest of the network, which is expressed by the maintenance cost. in an overlay network. We argue such a cost model is a useful complement to topological performance meu-ics [ 121.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
[18], in that it allows to predict disincentives to collaborate (nodes refusing to serve requests to reduce their cost), discover possible network instabilities (nodes leaving and rejoining in hopes of lowering their cost). identify hot spots (nodes with high routing load), and characterize the efficiency of a network as a whole.
We believe our cost model can be used beyond the context of overlay networks, and can in fact apply to most networked systems with competing entities. Indeed, by adopting different values for the parameters (I, Using analysis and simulations, we characterized the costs incurred with some of the recently proposed topoiogies for network overlays. The main finding is that. while very appealing from the point of view of resiliency and scalability, all of the geometries we analyzed can potentially create large imbalances in the load imposed on different nodes. We also showed that, assuming that all nodes have approximately the same degree of connectivity to the rest of the network, different types of imbalance (e.g., routing load vs. experienced latency) are generally independent. As a result. we concluded that designing very efficient load-balancing primitives is a must to avoid favoring some nodes at the expense of others. which can potentially create network instability. It is worth noting that several papers have attempted to tackle the problem of load-balancing, notably in the context of distributed hash tables. e.g., 1281, [29] . However, the load balancing algorithms proposed in the literature usually try to compensate for asymmetries in item popularity, while our study has shown that asymmetries in node connectivity arising from a sparsely populated identifier space were also a potential source of large imbalance.
We believe that this paper has sparked a number of avenues for future work. In particular, we only analyzed a handful of routing geometries, and even omitted interesting geometries such as the butterfly [203, geometries based on the XOR metric [Zl] . or interconnected star networks, as used in filesharing networks such as FastTrack or eDonkey. We believe that using the framework described in this paper will be useful in determining which type of topology is more appropriate for a specific application. A related open problem consists in obtaining a meaningful set of values for the parameters ( l , s, T , m ) for a given class of applications (e.g.. file sharing between PCs. ad-hoc routing between energy-constrained sen-sor motes). To that effect, we plan on gathering measurement data from deployed networks. such as file-sharing systems. content delivery networks, or deployed ad-hoc and (centralized) wireless networks. Last, we point out that a possible alternative to load balancing primitives is to devise incentive mechanisms that make it desirable for nodes to forward as much traffic as possible. Incentive mechanisms have started to receive attention from the systems community (e.g., [131, [30] , [31] ) and one of our hopes for the present paper is to foster more research in that direction.
